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Salt Lake City Prosecutor's
451 South 200 East, 4th Floor ***
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 DOCKET
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NO.
(801)535-7767

Utah Court of Aooeals

AUG 3 1 1999

-3H422-

Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk
of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SALT LAKE CITY,
A Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CITATION OF SUPPPLEMENTAL
AUTHORITIES

vs.
Case No. 981670-CA
JENNIFER KAY WOOD,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No.2

On August 23, 1999, oral arguments were held in the above-captioned matter before a
Panel of Judges consisting of Judge Bench, Judge Billings and Judge Orme. In light of the
questions posed by the Panel and pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, as amended, the following authorities are cited for consideration.
1. Regarding the issue of the burden for a facial attack on the constitutionally of a
statute/ordinance:
Roulette v. City of Seattle. 78 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1996)
State v. Mohl 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995)
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991)
2. Regarding the issue of regulation of expressive conduct:
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)
3. Regarding the effect of the 44 Liquormart case (cited in brief) on California v. LaRue
and its progeny (cited in brief):

Sammy's v. City of Mobile. No. 96-7073, decided May 8,1998 (11th Cir.)
Dated this 3f

day of A t ^ ^ X ~

, 1999.

A

Don M. Wrye
>rb:
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _J? / < # " ~ d a y of August, 1999,1 caused to be delivered
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Citation of Supplemental Authorities to the Appellant's
attorney, W. Andrew McCuUough, 895 West Center Street, Orem, Utah 84057, by placing the
same in the mail postage prepaid.

cfb^ WS^/-

Don M. Wrye
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor

W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH,
L.L.C.*
Attorney
at Law
895 West Center
Street
Or em, Utah 84057
*A2so admitted in New York
Telephone:
Facsimile:

(801)
(801)

222-9635
222-9128
ST * w

©£

August 24, 1999
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Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

DOCKET NO

v&lGlo

RE: "City of Salt Lake v. Jennifer K. Wood"
Appeal no. 981670-CA
Ladies & Gentlemen:
On August 23, 1999, oral arguments were held in this matter,
and counsel was asked whether facial attacks for overbreadth
under the First Amendment could be made on a city licensing
ordinance. Counsel cited the case of FW/PBS Inc. v. Dallas, 493
U.S. 215 (1990). It appears that appellant did not cite that
case in her brief. The authority relied on for the right to
challenge such a licensing ordinance is overbroad under the First
Amendment is found at 493 U.S. at 223-225.
This letter is a citation of supplemental authorities
pursuant to Rule 24 (i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Thank you for your consideration.

W. Andrew McCullough
WAM:lc
cc: Don M. Wrye, Esq.

CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
CLARK W. SESSIONS
RODNEY G. SNOW
STEVEN E. CLYDE
HAL N. SWENSON
WILLIAM V O G E L
E. BARNEY GESAS
EDWIN C. BARNES
GARY L. PAXTON
NEIL A. K A P L A N *
D. BRENT ROSE
PERRIN R. L O V E *
DEAN C. ANDREASEN
ANNELI R. SMITH
GAINER M. WALDBILLIG
REAGAN L. BRENNEMAN
WALTER A. ROMNEY, J R .
MATTHEW A. STEWARD
*ALSO ADMITTED IN WASHINGTON D C

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
ONE UTAH CENTER
THIRTEENTH FLOOR
2 0 I S O U T H MAIN STREET

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-2216
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BRIEF
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Utah Court of Appeals
Office of the Clerk
DOCKET NO
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
RE:

OF COUNSEL
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
TELEPHONE
(80I) 322-25I6

August 5, 1999
w,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
(I9I7-I99I)

FAX ( 8 0 l ) 5 2 I - 6 2 8 0

css@clydesnow.com

friGTS,-

Peterson v. Peterson
Appellate No. 981652-CA
Second District Court No. 824983079 DA
Priority No. 15

Clerk of the Court:
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(i) the attorneys for Appellee
hereby submit the supplemental authority of Williamson v. Williamson. 372 Utah Adv. Rep 45,
Appellate No. 981245-CA, decided July 1, 1999, a copy of which is hereafter attached. The
supplemental authority is relevant to this appeal in that it sets forth the proper standard for ruling
on a petition to terminate alimony. The supplemental authority is specifically relevant to
Argument 1 of the Brief of Appellee, page 5 and 6.
Respectfully submitted,
Clyde Sno^g^sions & Swenso

Clark W. Sessions
Matthew A. Steward
MAS/knh
enclosure
cc:
Michael Mohrman

Pode-Co
Provo» tftah

Williamson v. Williamson
372 Utah A<fr. Reg 45

45

Cite as
reasonable inferences from that evidence." State v.
372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45
Coyer, 814 P.2d 604,612 (Utah Ct App. 1991).
1 16
"A person commits theft if, having control
IN THE
over the disposition of services of another, to which
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to
his own benefit... .* Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-409(2)
(1995). Based on the evidence, the jury could have Joan WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was
enough evidence to satisfy the requisite elements of v.
theft of services. Defendant had entered into a Stuart Kim WILLIAMSON,
Defendant and Appellee.
private contract for which he was compensated over
and above his salary as Administrator. The county
commissioners told him to complete the work cm his No. 981245-CA
ovm time. Tfe county resources used by defendant FILED: July l t 1999
were arguablyforportions of the waste management
plan he had privately contracted to perform. Because First District, Logan Department
the jury is "entitled to judge the testimony in the The Honorable Clint S. Judkins
light of their experience in the every-day affairs of
life,1" Bryant, 965 R2d at 545 (emphasis omitted) ATTORNEYS:
(quoting Holland v. Brawn, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394
Larry E. Jones and Lyle W. Hillyard, Logan, for
P.2d 77, 79 (1964)), they were not imprudent in Appellant
concluding that defendant knew he should not have
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogdea, for Appellee
been using county resources for items that were
defendant's personal duty to complete under the Before Judges Wilkins, Jackson, and Orme.
_
private contract.
This opinion is subject to revision before final
CONCLUSION
publication in the Pacific Reporter
^ 17
The jury instruction on the failure to disclose
charge did not properly instruct the jury regarding the
mens rea. Even if it had, however, there was JACKSON, Judge:
insufficient competent evidence to show beyond a 11 Joan Williamson appeals the trial court's
reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly and termination of alimony and its denial of her request
intentionally Med to file the required disclosure for attorney fees. We reverse and remand for further
form. Accordingly, we reverse defendant's conviction proceedings.
BACKGROUND
for failure to disclose transaction to government
12 Joan and Stuart Kim Williamson divorced on
employer charge.
118
We do not disturb the jury's verdict finding May 24, 1996, following a twenty-three-year
defendant guilty of theft of services. There was marriage. When they divorced, they had one minor
sufficient evidence for a jury to find that defendant child, whose custody was awarded to Ms.
had diverted county resources for his own benefit Williamson. The parties stipulated that Mr.
that he knew he was not entitled to and over which Williamson would pay $368 per month as child
support and $425 per month as alimony. The
he had control.
stipulated decree provided that alimony would end
when Ms. Williamson married, cohabited, or died.
James Z. Davis, Judge
13 When they divorced, Mr. Williamson was
earning roughly $3,550 per month as a supervisor at
It*
WE CONCUR:
Morton Automotive Safety Products, hi late August
1996, Mr. Williamson was fired for unsatisfactory
Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding Judge performance and violating company policy. About
Norman H Jackson, Judge
| one month later, Mr. Williamson filed a Petition to
i Modify the child support provisions of the divorce
f decree. Shortly thereafter, he filed an Amended
1. Bath testimonial and documentary evidence show that Petition to Modify, asking that alimony also be
defendant's proposed involvement in the project was
modified. He asserted that the decrease in his income
appropriately disclosed to and approved by the county
was
a substantial change of circumstances justifying
commission. Accordingly, we will refer herein only to the
a reduction of both obligations.
failure to file a sworn statement portion of the charge.
^4 Mr. Williamson later started working for his
brother's drywali business as a drywall taper, making
$11 per hour. After a hearing on Mr. Williamson's
petition to modify, the trial court found that his
income was $2,090 per month. Mr. Williamson's
brother testified that he was paid less than other
workers because his age and physical problems
caused him to work slowly. Ms. Williamson
presented testimony that a drywaller of similar age
and physical health could make $ 13 to $ 15 per hour
15 Ms. Williamson's income at the time of the
divorce was $1,442 per month. By the time of the
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modification hearing, her pay had increased, and she court should consider evidence of, and enter findings
also earned some overtime pay and had taken a regarding, all four statutory factors: i.e., Ms.
part-time job. The trial court found her income to be Williamson's "financial conditions and needs" and
her "earning capacity or ability to produce income,"
$1,692 per month.
^6 At the close of the hearing, the trial court found Mr. Williamson's ability to provide support, and the
5
that there had been a substantial change of length of the parties' marriage. Utah Code Ann. §
circumstances since the parties divorced. The court 30-3-5(7Xa)(1998).
then reduced child support to S271.64 per month and 111
When considering Ms. Williamson's financial
ended alimony. The court ordered Mr. and Ms. condition and earning capacity, and Mr. Williamson's
Williamson to bear their own attorney fees.
ability to give support, the trial court should move
f7 On appeal, Ms. Williamson challenges the beyond merely considering their incomes and inquire
sufficiency of the trial court's findings regarding more fully into their financial situations, including
alimony. She also contends the trial court abused its Mr. Williamson's new spouse's "financial ability to
discretion in ending her alimony entirely. Finally, she share living expenses" with him. Id.
argues she should be awarded attorney fees both §30-3-5(7XgXiiiXA). This in-depth consideration of
below and on appeal.1
the parties' circumstances is necessary to fulfill the
goal of alimony, which is to equalize the parties'
ANALYSIS
standards of living, not just their incomes, in those
L Terminating Alimony
J8 Ms. Williamson first argues the trial court's cases in which insufficient resources exist to satisfy
findings of fact are insufficient to support aiding both parties' legitimate needs. See Olson v. Olson,
alimony.2 We agree. Before the trial court can modify 704 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah 1985£ Fullmer v.
a divorce decree, it must find that there has been a Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah Ct App. 1988).
"substantial material change of circumstances not Moreover, the trial court should consider current
foreseeable at the time of the divorce."3 Utah Code evidence of the parties' financial situations, as their
Ann. § 30-3-5(7XgXi) (1998). Once thatfindinghas "circumstances . . . may have changed during this
been made, the court must then consider "at least the appeal."Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431,438 (Utah Ct
following factors in determining alimony: (i) the App. 1999).
financial condition and needs ofthe recipient spouse; T[12
Although our decision is based on the
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to insufficiency of the findings below, we remind the
produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse trial court that "the power to terminate [alimony}
to provide support; and (iv) the length of the should be exercised with caution and only after full
marriage." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (1998).4 consideration of the circumstances of the parties..
These factors apply not only to an initial award of . ." 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 813
alimony, but also to a redetermination of alimony (1998) (emphasis added). We note, for the trial
during a modification proceeding. See Christiansen court's guidance on remand, that
v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 592,595 (Utah 1983). The
for the trial court to terminate [an] alimony
trial court must then makefindingsof fact based on
award, there must be an articulated basis for
these factors. See Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d
doing so; i.e., the court must be persuaded
877, 880 (Utah Ct App. 1995).
that [the recipient spouse] will be able to
^9 The standard for findings in modification
support [him- or] herself at a standard of
w,
proceedings is well established. (T]he trial court
living to which [he or] she was accustomed
must make findings on all material issues, and its
during the parties' marriage, or that [the
failure to delineate what circumstances have changed
payor spouse] is no longer able to pay.
and why these changes support the modification Fullmer, 761 P.2d at 951. In determining this, the
made in the prior divorce decree constitutes trial court should consider Mr. Williamson's reduced
reversible error unless the facts in the record are income, but that factor alone is not enough to justify
clear, uncontroverted and only support the ending alimony. See Jense v. Sense, 784 P.2d 1249,
judgment.m Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah 1252 (Utah Ct App. 1989) ("The loss of a job . . .
Ct App. 1992) (quoting Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, may go to [a payor spouse's] ability to pay the
790 P.2d 57,61 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The findings judgment, but it is not a proper basis upon which to
should be more than cursory statements; they must change the amount of the original award."). We note
"be sufficiently detailed and include enough further that the child support paid by Mr. Williamson
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the to Ms. Williamson is earmarked for the parties'
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was minor child and should not be considered as income
reached.'" Id. (quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 to Ms. Williamson for purposes of calculating
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)).
alimony. SeeReickv. Reick, 652 P.2d 916,917(Utah
110
In this case, the trial court stated that it was 1982) (stating "the basic and unalienable right to
"painting with a broad brush," and made findings child support... is vested in the minor").
only on the parties' incomes at the time of the divorce
DL Attorney Fees
and at the time of the modification hearing. The trial H13
Ms. Williamson argues the trial court should
court, however, should have substituted a sharpened have awarded her attorney fees below. Section
pencil for its broad brush and set forth detailed 30-3-3( 1) states that a trial court may award attorney
findings on the factors specified in section 30-3- fees in a modification proceeding. See Utah Code
5(7Xa). "Accordingly, we remand for the trial court
Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (1998). Here, each party proffered
to enter adequate findings, supported by sufficient
$ 1,500 in attorney fees, and neither party objected to
evidence," on the factors set forth in section
the other's proffer or the reasonableness of the fees.
30-3-5(7Xa). Muir, 841 P.2d at 741. That is, the trial
The trial court ordered both parties to pay their own

Gilbert v. Ince
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attorney fees, but made no findings about either on remand.
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-party's need for or ability to pay attorney fees. "In
short, the court gave no explanation for requiring
Cite as
each party tobear his or her own fees and costs. The» [
372 Utah Adv. Rep. 47
absence of these findings prevents a meaningfulI [
reviewoffetrfelcourts ruling." Wilde v. Wilde>969> I
P.2d438,444(tftahCt App. 1998). A c c o n E n ^ w e
IN THE SUPREME COURT
remand for the trial court to reconsider Ms.'
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Williamson's request for attorney fees and to enter
6
I
Cyndi
W.
GILBERT,
findings regarding the same.
I
Plaintiff
and Appellant,
;
ft 4
Ms. Williamson also requests attorney fees
on appeal. She is the successful party on appeal and,
accordingly, should she be awarded attorney fees on[ I Paul R. INCE and Callister, Nebeker &
remand, we instruct the trial court also to hear• I McCuJIough (fka Callister, Duncan & Nebeker),
evidence regarding her reasonable attorney fees cm [ a Utah professional corporation,
Defendants and Appellees.
appeal and to order Mr. Williamson to pay those I
fees. See id. If the trial court does not award her
attorney fees below, she will bear her own attorney I No. 9793*2
I FILED: July 2,1999
fees and costs incurred on appeal.
1999 UT 65
CONCLUSION
^15
We remand to rJie trial court to cx>nsider, and
enterfindingsregarding, the alimony factors set out J Fifth District, St George Dept
in section 30-3-5{7Xa). Should the result differ cm I The Honorable J. Philip Eves
remand, we direct tie trial courttoenter appropriate
conclusions and an order regarding alimony. We also I ATTORNEYS:
Scott M Lilja, Jonathan Hawkins, Salt Lake
remand for entry of findings, conclusions, and an I
order regarding attorney fees below. If Ms. I City, for plaintiff
Stephen G. Morgan, Cynthia K. C. Meyer,
Williamson is awarded fees below, we order that she I
1 Jeffrey C. Miner, Salt Lake City, for defendants
also be awarded her fees on appeal.
I
I

Norman R Jackson, Judge
t!6

This opinion is subject to revision beforefinal
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

WE CONCUR:

I RUSSON, Justice;
I Tfl PlaintiffCyndt W. Gilbert appealsfroma verdict
[ in favor of defendants Paul R. Ince and the law firm
I ofCallister, Nebeker &McCuUough. Gilbert brought
I suit against defendants, allegingthey had wrongfully
1.'We declinetoaddress Ms. Williamson's other arguments I used civil proceedings in filing and maintaining a
because they are without merit or not necessary to our I malpractice action against her. The trial court
disposition^thucase. SeeStdtev. Carter, 776 P.2d 886,888 I conducted a jury trial and, at the conclusion of
(Utah, 1989) (stating we "need not analyze and address in
writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and I Gilbert's case in chief, granted defendants motion for
I a directed verdict We affirm.
properly before us on appeal").
Michael J Wilkins, Presiding Judge
Gregory K Qrme, Judge

2. We agree with Ms. WiJIiamson that she "need not engage in BACKGROUND
a futile marshalling exercise [because she} can demonstrate the I f2 Cyndi Gilbert is an attorney* as was Paul R. Ince
findings, asframedby the court, are legally insufficient" I at the time the relevant events in this case occurred.
Campbell VL Campbell* 896 P.2d635, 638 (Utah Ct App.
I Ince was a shareholder of the firm Callister, Nebeker
1995).
3. Ms. Williamson does act challenge the detennination that [ &Mc^unough(fonnerIy known as Callister, Ehmcan
there was a substantial material change of circumstances. As & Nebeker). The events giving rise to this case
the trial courts ^determination that there fhas or has not] been primarily concern the financial affairs of
a substantial change of circumstances.. .is presumed valid," Dr. Charles E. Gunnoe. Gilbert and Ince acted as
and she has not challenged that determination, we will not Gunnoe's attorney on separate occasions, representing
disturb the trial court's ruling on this issue. WeUs v. Wells, 871 his interests as a claimant in different bankruptcy
P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct App. 1994) (alterations in
proceedings. Gilbert began representing Gunnoe in
original).
4. Section 30-3-5(7)(a) codifies the three factors set out in ; early 1986 with respect to Gunnoe's interest in real
English v. Enghsh, 565 P.2d 409,411-12 (Utah 1977), and property held by an entity known as Mountain View
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Iftah 1985X often j Holdings Ltd. Ince began representing Gunnoe in
referred to as the "Jones factors." The statute adds a fourth mid-1990 with respect to Gunnoe's interests in assets
factor-the length of the parties' marriage.
5. That the parties were married for twenty-three years was an held by Brian Head Enterprises, Inc.
undisputed fact before the trial court However, because the ^3 A complicated series of events linked the two
findings are cursory, we do not know whether the trial court bankruptcy proceedings, which resulted in Gunnoe's
considered the long length of the marriage in deciding to end filing suit against Gilbert for malpractice in
alimony.
September of 1990. The malpractice
6. Insofar as the court's decision to have Ms. Williamson pay complaint—prepared and signed by Ince in his
her own fees is attnbutable to Mr. Williamson's having
prevailed on his petition-something the trial court did not capacity as Gunnoe's attorney-consisted of two
articulate but might have had in muid-the rationale may need essential claims: breach of contract and conflict of
to be reassessed, depending on the outcome of the proceedings interest. In substance, the complaint alleged that

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

U I AH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
K FU
50
DOCKET NO.

^ / ^
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Attorney for Plaintiff
Aspen Plaza
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WESLEY CLOCK and ANNE CLOCK,
Plaintiff-Appellees,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES

vs.
JOHN F. GREEN and LARUE GREEN,

Docket No. 981612
Defendants-Appellants.

The Appellees, Wesley Clock and Anne Clock, move the Court for Summary Disposition
pursuant to Rule 10, U.R. App.P., to dismiss the instant appeal, and for sanctions and an award
of attorneys fees against Appellants and their counsel pursuant to Rule 33(a), U.R. App.P, This
Motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum and the Affidavit of Wesley Clock filed
therewith.
DATED this

day of December, 1998.

Bryan W. Cannon, Attorney for Appellees

-yx>

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Summary
Disposition and Motion for Attorneys Fees, postage prepaid, first class mail, to:
Stephen G. Homer
Attorney for Appellants
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088

this/2? day of December, 1998.

